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Notes
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL LAW-STATUTORY CONSTRUC-"
TION AND INTERPRTATION-Defendants were prosecuted under Ar-
ticle 104 of the Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942,' for intentionally
maintaining a place "to be used habitually as a meeting place for
prostitutes and men desirous of their company... ." In dismissing
the prosecution, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that Article 104,
"insofar as it defines the crime of keeping a disorderly place as 'the
intentional maintaining of a place to be used habitually for any ...
immoral purpose,'" is unconstitutional in that it is vague and indefi-
nite and leaves to the court the determination of the crime, which
power is reserved to the legislature alone. State v. Truby, 211 La. 178,
29 So. (2d) 758 (1947).
Article 7 of the Louisiana Criminal Code2 was cited in the in-
stant case as authority for the statement that in Louisiana "nothing
is a crime which is not made so by statute."8 That article is a re-
statement of the civil law principle nullum crimen sine lege, which
has been interpreted as meaning merely that a legislative basis must
be found for each crime, and that each charge must be based on
some specific code article.4 It is submitted that the rule does not
involve a general conclusion that every article must be subjected to
the narrowest interpretation in favor of a defendant.5 Justice Haw-
thorne, speaking for the court, stated, "it is equally true that a penal
statute must be strictly construed and cannot be extended to cases
not included within the clear import of its language, and that noth-
ing is a crime which is not clearly and unmistakably made a crime."'
1. Art. 104, La. Crim. Code of 1942: "Keeping a Disorderly Place is the
intentional maintaining of a place to be used habitually for any illegal or immoral
purpose...."
2. Art. 7, La.'Crim. Code of 1942: "A Crime is that conduct which is defined
as criminal in this Code, or in other acts of legislature, or in the constitution of
this state."
3. State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 29 So. (2d) 758, 759 (1947).
4. Morrow, The Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942-Opportunities Lost and
Challenges Yet Unanswered (1942) 17 Tulane L. Rev. 1, 8. See also Hall. Nufla
Poena Sine Lege (1937) 47 Yale L. J. 165.
5. Ibid.
6. State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 29 So. (2d) 758, 762 (1947), citing as authority
Arts. 3, 7, La. Civil Code of 1870; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 28 L. Ed.
568 (1875); State v. Breffeihl, 180 La. 904, 58 So. 763 (1912); State v. Comeaux,
181 La. 930, 60 So. 620 (1918). In State v. Breffeihl, the defendant was acquitted,
not because of any defect or indefiniteness in the statute, but, in the words of
the court, "If interpreted as here contended, the statute would be made to say
[129]
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Although the common law rule of strict construction 7 was not
expressly abrogated in the Louisiana Criminal Code, it seems that
Article 3 of that Codes necessarily operates to suppress it? The
Louisiana State Law Institute, in compiling the Code, refused to
enunciate this rule of strict construction. The language and devel-
opment of Article 3 of the Louisiana Code leads to the conclusion
that it provides for neither a strict nor a liberal construction, but for
a logical one. The court cannot give the provisions of the Code "a
genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words,
taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with
reference to the purpose of the provision,"'" and still indulge in the
strict construction methods of the common law."'
something which it does not expressly say, and does not even by necessary impli-
cation say." State v. Comeaux is distinguishable, in that the statute involved
made no attempt to define the crime denounced, while in United States -0. Reese,
the statute was held unconstitutional, not for vagueness or indefiniteness, but
because Congress had exceeded the authority conferred upon it by the Fifteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. In fact, the court in the latter
case said, "If Congress had the power to provide generally for the punishment
of those who unlawfully interfere to prevent the exercise of the elective franchise
without regard to such discrimination, the language of these sections would be
broad enough for that purpose."
7. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U. S. 76 (1820); United States v. 84 Boxes
of Sugar, 32 U. S. 453 (1838); Bishop, Commentaries on the Written Laws and
Their Interpretation (1882) § 119; 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (Horack's
3 ed., 1943) 49, § 5604. However, there has been diversity of opinion in virtually
every jurisdiction as to the merits and demerits of the rule. See Hal, Strict or
Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes (1985) 48 Harv. L. Rev. 748.
8. Art. 3, La. Crim. Code of 1942: "The articles of this Code cannot be
extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for herein; however,
in order to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of its provi-
sions shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their
ords, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference
to the purpose of the provision."
9. The writer here shares the opinion of Professor Morrow, one of the
reporters of the Louisiana Criminal Code; Morrow, supra note 4, at 10. As
originally drafted Article 3 expressly abolished the rule of strict construction.
However, this provision was later deleted and even though the remainder of the
article was left intact, it can hardly be said with any degree of certainty that
this rule was completely eliminated.
10. Art. 8, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
11. Even if Article 3 be held to justify a rule of strict construction, there
are certain well established rules of statutory interpretation which were over-
looked in the instant case. It is universally recognized that, even if a rule of
strict construction be applied, penal statutes are not to be construed so strictly
as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. In determining that intent,
the court has authority to consider the comments under the particular statute,
as well as prior and concurrent legislation. A reference to such sources beyond
question that the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting Article 104 was to
punish acts such as were charged in the bill of indictment in the principal case.
See Reporter's Comments under Art. 104, La. Act 199 of 1912, and La. Act 241
of 1942.
1947] NOTES
The United States Supreme Court in its treatment of the "White
Slave Traffic Act"12 and the Immigration Act of 1917'" has found
little difficulty in interpreting the phrase "immoral purpose" and
has upheld these statutes against attacks of vagueness."" Courts of
other jurisdictions have upheld and applied statutes requiring the
courts to give content to such terms as "immoral purpose,"' 5 "inde-
cent conduct,"'" and "rude or indecent behavior."' 7  The Louisiana
legislature has previously enacted statutes containing similar provi-
sions, s but the court was not called upon to interpret such provisions
before their repeal. 9
In State v. Rose,2" the defendant contended that since the statute
declared "any place . . . where lewd dancing is permitted" to be a
disorderly house,2' a conviction or acquittal would depend altogether
on the trial judge's idea of graceful movement or wearing apparel.
The court said:
"It might as well be argued that the familiar statutes against
indecent exposure of the person in a public place are invalid,
because some . . . prudish judge might be unreasonable in his
condemnation of decollet6 costumes.... It is too well settled to
admit of argument that a statute should not be deemed invalid
because a rigid enforcement of it might result in injustice.... ,2 2
12. Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 825 (1911), 18 U. S. C. A. § 398 (1927).
la 84 Stat. 898, 899, § 3 (1907).
14. United States v. Bitty, 208 U. S. 393, 28 S. Ct. 396, 52 L. Ed. 543 (1907);
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 37 S. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442 (1917);
United States v. Lewis, 110 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940), cert. denied 310
U. S. 634, 60 S. Ct. 1077, 84 L. Ed. 1404 (1940); Cleveland v. United States, 67
S. Ct. 13, 91 L. Ed. (adv. 1) (U. S. 1946).
15. State v. Reed, 53 Mont. 292, 163 Pac. 477 (1916).
16. Tanner v. State, 21 Ala. App. 14, 105 So. 712 (1925).
17. Reeves v. State, 96 Ala. 33, 11 So. 296 (1892).
18. La. Act 287 of 1910, § 1 ("immoral pursuit or occupation"); La. Act 288
of 1910 ("place of immoral character"); La. Act 295 of 1910, § 1 ("immoral
purpose"); La. Act 307 of 1910, § 2 ("immoral purposes").
19. In State v. Scallan, 201 La. 1026, 10 So. (2d) 885 (1942) however, the
defendant was prosecuted under Act 139 of 1916, which made it a misdemeanor
for parents or guardians to permit a child under their control and under seven-
teen years of age "to enter any place where the morals of such child may be
corrupted, endangered or depraved, or may likely be impaired." The defendant
was convicted for having taken his thirteen year old daughter into a night club.
The statute set no standard as to what type of place would corrupt a child's
morals and what type would not, but left the question to the determination of
the judge. It would seem that if the court can validly find that a place will
"tend to corrupt the morals," then it could likewise find that a place is maintained
for an "immoral purpose."
20. 147 La. 243, 84 So. 643 (1920).
21. La. Act 199 of 1912.
22. 147 La. 243, 254, 84 So. 643, 647. In the same case the court, per O'Niell,
J., after referring to several of the cases cited in the majority opinion of the
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The court's reference to statutes against indecent exposure might
well apply also to those against disturbing the peace, disorderly con-
duct, indecent behavior with juveniles, and others. Offenses of this
kind may be committed through a wide variety of conduct, and it
is not to be expected that the legislature will undertake the cumber-
some and probably impossible task of providing for all detailed
violations in advance. Furthermore, an incomplete enumeration
would provide a technical loophole through which a guilty defend-
ant might evade the law. The avowed intention of the reporters
and of the legislature in enacting Article 104 of the Criminal Code
was to draft a general definition which would "include all types of
disorderly houses and places known as such, or which might become
known as such in the future."2
While the decision in the Truby case might be justified by the
admittedly broad scope of Article 104, it would be unfortunate if
some of the court's generalizations should be extended further. If
the court should extend the reasoning of the Truby case and adopt
a policy of undue technicality, the very foundation on which the
Criminal Code is based will be dealt a crippling blow.
ELMON W. HOLMES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS UNDER THE
UNITED STATES WAREHOUSE AcT-Defendant was charged with
numerous violations of a state statute regulating grain warehouses.
Included were the exaction of unjust discriminatory rates, conflict
of interest as warehouseman and dealer in grain, failure to provide
reasonable and adequate facilities, improper mixing of public and
private grades of grain, failure to publish rates, and failure to obtain
a state license. Defendant, licensee under the United States Ware-
house Act,' set up the exclusive coverage of that act. Held, where
a matter over which a state asserts the right to control is in any way
regulated by a federal act, "the federal scheme prevails though it is
a more modest, less pervasive regulatory plan than that of the state."
Rice v. Santa Elevator Corporation, 67 S. Ct. 1146 (U. S. 1947).2
Truby case, said: "The decisions cited supra, therefore, are not to be regarded
as a departure from the doctrine, now well settled, that a statute which defines
and denounces certain conduct as a crime is not rendered invalid by investing
the trial judge with some discretion in determining whether the facts of a given
ease shall bring it within the purview of the law."
23. Reporters' Comment, Arts. 104, 105, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
1. 89 Stat. 486 (1916) as amended, 7 U. S. C. A. § 241 (1931).
2. See also the companion case of First Iowa Hydro-Electric Co-op. v. Fed-
eral.Power Commission, 828 U. S. 152, 66 S. Ct. 906, 90 L. Ed. 1148 (1945). This
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